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best rule. There are, however, two situations in which a minority rule
is sounder. A private person should, contrary to the majority rule, be
able to make an arrest for a felony upon reasonable belief that one
has been committed. Further a private person should not be allowed
to arrest for a misdemeanor committed in his presence not amounting
to a breach of the peace. It is contended that public interest is great
enough in the first situation to warrant arrest by a private person,
while in the second situation these lesser offenses are not a serious
enough threat to the public to afford the right of arrest by a private
person.
The result reached by accepting the majority view with these two
exceptions could be codified briefly as follows:
A police officer may arrest without a warrant:
(1) for a felony committed in his presence;
(2) upon reasonable belief that a felony has been committed and
reasonable belief that the person arrested committed it;
(3) to prevent the commission of a felony;
(4) for a misdemeanor committed in his presence.
A private person may arrest without a warrant:
(1) for a felony committed in his presence;
(2) upon reasonable belief that a felony has been committed and
reasonable belief that the person arrested committed it;
(8) to prevent the commission of a felony;
(4) for any misdemeanor amounting to a breach of the peace com-
mitted in his presence.
NoimA D. Bosrpn
CRIMINAL LAW-THE USE OF FORCE IN DEFENSE
OF PROPERTY
In most civilized countries, the right to acquire and own property
is recognized by law. Therefore, it would seem reasonable to assume
that in connection with the right to own, a property owner should
have a right to defend his property against an aggressor. Nevertheless,
it is axiomatic that the law places a higher value on life than on prop-
erty. Consequently there exists a basic principle that one is not
privileged to kill in order to protect property.' However, certain ex-
'Russell v. State, 219 Ala. 567, 122 So. 683 (1929); 1 BISHOP, Cmn~fnAL
LAw 610 (9th ed. 1928); MAY, CRnINAL LAW 76 (4th ed. 1988); 26 Am. Jut.
272 (1940); 40 C. J. S. 977 (1944).
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ceptions to this principle are recognized by the courts. The purpose
of this note is to appraise the validity of these exceptions and to show
to what extent force may be used by a person in defending his prop-
erty.
Killing to prevent the commission of a felony is the main exception
stated by the courts. According to the cases, homicide in defense of
property is justifiable when committed in the prevention of a felony
accompanied with "violence or surprise."2 The felonies usually enu-
merated are murder, rape, sodomy, burglary, arson, and robbery.3
In considering each felony and its elements, it is clear that the first
three listed felonies are strictly against the person. Although they
might occur in connection with defense of property, the real basis for
justifying the use of force is self-defense which is a branch of the law
separate from that which applies to defense of property. The latter
three felonies, namely burglary, arson, and robbery, are generally con-
sidered crimes against property. These will be examined in order.
First, burglary at common law is the breaking and entering of
another's dwelling house in the nighttime with the intent to commit
a felony therein.4 The breaking may be actual or constructive. If
there is neither force nor fraud there is no burglary.6 The term
"dwelling house" means a building which is actually occupied as such,
although it may also be occupied for other purposes; and it includes
the entire cluster of buildings, not separated by a public way, which
are used for purposes connected with habitation.7 However, the law
punishes burglary primarily, not because of the injury to the dwelling
house, but because of the potential danger to human life inherent in
the offense.
Similarly the second felony, arson, at common law is the malicious
burning of another's dwelling house.8 It is an offense against the
security afforded by a man's dwelling house, and the law looks upon it
in this light rather than as an injury to his property.9 Arson presents
the question of defense of habitation, as did burglary.
'Storey v. State, 71 Ala. 329 (1882); Brown v. State, 149 Ark. 588, 233 S.W.
762 (1921); Shafer v. State, 191 Ga. 722, 13 S.E. 2d 798 (1941); Commonwealth
v. Beverly, 237 Ky. 35, 34 S.W. 2d 941 (1931).
" See cases cited supra note 2.
'2 BIsHoP, CimxwA. LAw 69 (9th ed. 1923); MAY, C..uNAL LAw 307(4th ed. 1938).5 MAY, CmNAL LAW 307 (4th ed. 1938).
'2 BIsHoP, CmINAL LAW 72 (9th ed. 1923); MAY, CnnnaNL LAW 307 (4th
ed. 1938).
'2 BISHOP, CrtmNqAL LAW 307 (9th ed. 1923); MAY, CaMnNL LAW 80 (4th
ed. 1938).8 BIsHoP, C.mnNAL LAw 6 (9th ed. 1923); MAY, C, mNAL LAW 302 (4th
ed. 1938).
"MAY, CmNm AL LAw 302 (4th ed. 1938).
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Third, robbery is larceny from the person or his personal presence
by force or violence or by putting him in fear.10 It seems that this
felony injects the question of danger to human life and also self-
defense and certain other defenses against potential personal violence.
Thus it is found that all the felonies included in the rule involve
potential violence to the person.
Larceny, which can be either a felony or a misdemeanor, is the
only other felony which merits discussion. Larceny is commonly de-
fined to be felonious taking and carrying away of the personal property
of another." Larceny is a felony which does not involve self-defense
or defense of habitation. Since larceny is a secret crime not attended
with force or violence, it does not warrant the killing of a person to
prevent its consummation.'2 So larceny is taken out of the exception
in modem decisions.
The felonies which have been discussed are the general common
law felonies involved in defense of property. These do not include all
the crimes which have been made felonies by statute. The fact that
these statutory felonies include such a wide scope of offenses only adds
to the confusion of the formerly stated general principles as to killing
to prevent a felony.
Another so-called exception that is stated by the courts in homicide
cases is that assault or assault and battery might be justifiable in de-
fense of property13 although homicide is not. In a Pennsylvania case
decided in 1945,'14 the defendant was indicted and convicted of ag-
gravated assault and battery. In his defense he replied upon his right
as a property owner to defend his property. The defendant had pur-
chased an automobile which was financed and had failed to meet the
installments. The finance company's representatives came to de-
fendant's apartment at eleven o'clock, rank the bell, and received no
response. The defendant's car was at this time parked in the driveway.
The automobile was pushed out onto the main street, and the hood
was raised to check the serial numbers. The defendant, believing
that the men were stealing her car, fired two shots to frighten them,
not intending to hit either. Thus the issue presented to the court was:
Where in good faith, and upon reasonable grounds, one believes his
automobile in being stolen, from where it is parked in broad daylight
' 2 BisHop, Cnm mLi LAw 860 (9th ed. 1923); MAY, C nNmu. LAv 296
(4th ed. 1938).
' MAY, Cmnm-AL LAW 318 (4th ed. 1938).
Commonwealth v. Beverly, 237 Ky. 35, 34 S.W. 2d 941 (1931); State v.
Plumlee, 177 La. 687, 149 So. 425 (1933).
= State v. MeLeod, 82 Ohio App. 155, 80 N.E. 2d 699 (1949).
"Commonwealth V. Emmons, 157 Pa. Super. 495, 43 A. 2d. 568 (1945).
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on an unopened street, may he shoot the person believed to be the
thief in order to prevent the supposed larceny? The court answered
this question in the negative, basing its reasoning on the already well
established rule discussed above, that homicide is not justifiable in the
defense of property. In discussing the right to kill to prevent the
commission of a felony, the court pointed out that this right does not
extend to the prevention of all felonies. They further stated that killing
may be justifiable only in the cases of an atrocious or forceful crime.
The court then came to their conclusion by a process of elimination,
and held that the defendant was not defending her person nor her
home; that there was no felony by force nor any atrocious crime to be
prevented; that there was no danger to her habitation; therefore there
was no justification in law for the infliction of bodily harm.
Having narrowed the rule to this extent, the problem is the de-
termination of the amount of force which may actually be used in
cases not coming within the recognized exception. In solving this
problem, the courts repeatedly say that "one may lawfully use that
amount of force which is necessary under the circumstances." 15 It
may be readily seen that this statement may be very dangerous in its
application. A more conservative and more accurate statement is that
the force used should be such as a reasonable person would have
used under the circumstances. 16
Realistically speaking, the existing law may be summarized as
follows: In cases of trespass to real property, there is a requirement
that the trespasser be first requested to leave the property before any
action is taken against him.17 If this has been done and the trespasser
has refused to leave, then the owner may use such force as is reason-
ably necessary under the circumstances, 18 but may not use a deadly
weapon except in extreme cases. 19 In those cases, self-defense becomes
a factor.
As to chattels, the courts have no definition for either "necessary"
or "force". They make no reference to whether "necessary" force is
that which is required to prevent a crime or whether it is that which
is necessary to get the property back. Whether the force used is neces-
' Russell v. State, 219 Ala. 567, 122 So. 683 (1929); State v. Terrell, 55
Utah 314, 186 P. 108 (1919); 1 BIsHop, Cin~r AL LAW 612 (9th ed. 1923).
" State v. Cessna, 170 Iowa 726, 153 N.W. 194 (1915); Stacey v. Common-
wealth, 189 Ky. 402, 225 S:W. 37, (1920); Garner v. State, - Miss. -, 2 So. 2d
828 (1941).
7 Fore v. Commonwealth, 291 Ky. 34, 163 S.W. 48 (1942).
" Peasley v. Puget Sound Tug & Barge Co., 13 Wash. 2d 485, 125 P. 2d 681(1942); State v. Flanagan, 76 W.Va. 783, 86 S.E. 890 (1915).
"State v. Schloredt, 57 Wyo. 1, 111 P. 2d 128 (1941).
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sary is said to be largely a question for the jury.20 Here the rule is
very confusing. Force amounting to killing or seriously wounding the
tortfeasor should not be permitted and this is believed to be the law.
In conclusion it may be said that the law as to the right to defend
property, although seemingly well settled, is in reality somewhat in
confusion. As has been previously stated, the courts seldom base their
decisions on defense and protection of property alone. It is believed
that reliance solely upon protection of property as a defense in a crimi-
nal or civil case is impossible as a matter of law, except under situations
coming within the recognized exceptions.
ANNE H. WooDs
CREDITORS' RIGHTS-JUDGMENT LIENS AND PBIORITIES
IN KENTUCKY
An important problem relating to rights of creditors is to determine
when a judgment creditor acquires a lien on the property of a judg-
ment debtor and the effect of such acquisition. Especially perplexing
is determining the priorities of liens between the judgment creditor
and other creditors and purchasers. An effort will be made to formu-
late from Kentucky statutes and decisions the correct procedure to be
followed by the judgment creditor who desires to secure his judg-
ment by obtaining and perfecting a lien on the debtor's property. The
reader is advised, however, that the information gathered from the
statutes and cases may be supplemented beneficially by an examina-
tion of lower court records in particular communities, because rela-
tively few cases pertaining to this subject have reached the Court of
Appeals.
There are divergent views in different jurisdictions as to the exact
time when a lien on property of the debtor is created in favor of the
judgment creditor.1 This diversity can be attributed to the fact that
the creation of liens is now almost universally based upon statutory
law. In order to determine the proper procedure to be followed by
the judgment creditor, it is necessary to examine the applicable statutes
of the state in which the judgment is rendered. Not only do statutes
' Garner v. State, - Miss. -, 2 So. 2d 828 (1941); State v. Terrell, 55 Utah
314, 186 P. 108 (1919).
'For a general discussion of the various state statutes and interpretations see
31 Am. Jun. 16 et seq.; 1 GLENN, FRAuDuLx CoNvEyANcEs AND PEFERENCES
37 et seq. (1940).
